The White Nights of Dostoyevsky in light of the Proposal of Mary Louise Pratt

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Abstract

This paper seeks to reveal the relationship that exists between ordinary and literary language, in terms of pragmatics, and to demonstrate, with examples, that authors in the field of pragmatics have chosen to criticize this instead of heeding the information that this relationship divulges. By way of Pratt's work toward speech act theory for literary discourse (1980), it can be ensured that linguistics return to the literature field, via the application of theories characteristic of pragmatics. In his work, Pratt borrows concepts from Austin, Searle, Grice, and even Labov, in order to form the columns of a possible theory of speech acts in literary discourse, and with it, a path toward pragma literature with a wide range of possible study. In the present article, we will apply these concepts and theories to the literary work entitled 'White nights,' by Dostoyevsky, to show the plausibility of these ideas.

Key words: Pragmatics; Speech acts; Pragma literature; Literary work; White nights; Cooperation principle; Maxims.

Introduction

Among the series of difficulties that the stark division between literary and ordinary language has produced, among the most notable is the problem of fiction. The fact that literary work forms part of a fictitious world has not only been the object of study of philosophers and theorists, such as Dolezel- Lubomír (2000), but has also pushed the world of literary work to be distanced from the linguistic, and situated the two at opposite poles, generating diverse theories that only address the literature phenomenon. It is left to linguistic philosophers and linguists to attempt to reconcile these two positions, which seem so very different, and find points in common, using the same argument as fiction. The present document contains

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a brief summary of the most notable contents of this discussion, in an effort to locate said commonalities, as linguistic pragmatics has more to do with literary work than one might see, at first glance.

A pragmatic-literary proposal

Speech acts and the literary universe

It may be said that the linguistic pragmatics discipline began to grow in earnest after 1962, thanks to John Austin's posthumous work, entitled *How to do things with words.* Therein, Austin proposes and develops the idea that articulating something is also the performance of an action, and exemplifies the ways in which those involved in conversation may obtain things by just naming them. The main substance of their theory revolves around the term 'speech act,' and its respective parts. A speech act encompasses three actions simultaneously: locutive, illocutive, and perlocutive speech acts.

The locutive speech act is the simple production of sound, with the vocal apparatus. One of the characteristics that define us is the possession and use of our ability to speak. "I call the act of 'saying something', in its complete and normal acceptation, the performance of a locutionary act, and I call the study of expressions, in that means, and in those respects, the study of locutions, or of complete discourse units" (Austin, Conference VIII, p. 62).

The locutive speech act, in other words, is the use of the vocal system to produce sounds with meaning in a language. In contrast, the illocutive speech act is that which contains the speaker's intention. This is where the speaker's intended message exists, though they may not explicitly say so. In Austin's words: "This is to carry out the act of saying something, as something different than performing the act of saying something" (1982, p. 5). Lastly, there is a reaction in he who perceives our message and intention. The reaction that we achieve therewith is known as a perlocutive speech act.

Lastly, said perlocutive speech act, which authorizes the listener to become an interpreter, and assume a given position, based upon that heard from the speaker, and react to the message, constitutes the perlocutive act.

> On occasion, and even normally, saying something will produce certain consequences or effects on the feelings, thoughts, or actions of those who hear, he who expresses, or others. It is possible that, we say things with the purpose, intention, or design of producing said effects [...]. We will call the performance of this type of act a perlocutionary act, or perlocution (Austin, 1982, p. 66).

The speech act triad, together with its situational context, is fundamental for the development of linguistic pragmatics, as a discipline that studies the use of language, in certain circumstances.

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It might be said that the application of this concept to literary work would go off without a hitch, however this is not the case. One of the first difficulties emerges, thanks to Austin himself, for whom the speech act must occur in everyday communicative situations, in order to maintain their illocutive and perlocutive forces intact, or for the intention of the speaker and reaction of the hearer to occur.

According to Austin, there language manipulation occurs in literary work. Therein, there is a "suspension" of the rules which govern the speech act, and, as such, it merits neither attention nor study. The qualifier he employs to refer to this is 'parasite'.

> There are some, linguistic «parasites», that are not «serious», or do not consti-tute their full normal use. The normal reference conditions may be suspended or be absent for the performance of a typical perlocutionary act, every attempt to cause the hearer to do something (Austin, 1982, p. 196).

Austin's concern is justifiable, given that the aforementioned manipulation is obvious: in a literary piece, dialogues between characters are prefabricated in the mind of the author, who simulates the consequences of characters' intentions. As such, its imitation is nourished thereby (thus Austin's qualifier "parasite"). The suspension of perlocutive conditions causes the illocutive speech act to have little relevance for those who analyze the work, and it is there that normal conditions, for Austin, are suspended.

Up to this point, the paths of literary and linguistic pragmatics work seem irreversibly forked, an irreconcilable relationship in which so-called ordinary language is a source of food for literary language, which imitates its forms and functions. The hotel of linguistics has changed its address, and the field of literary work has adopted a different perspective. This task, then, of pragmatics, focuses on the uses and ways in which speakers express their ideas, make themselves understood, and communicate, while literature transcends the fields that provide this first language.

In 1971, Richard Ohmann opened the dispute, once again, when he published an article called Speech acts and the definition of literature. Therein, he asked for a definition of litera-ture that was supported by the proposal of Wittgenstein of family similarities. Ohmann affirms that there must be a definition of literature that separates it from its other meaning, or the compendium of work from a specific discipline (literature on market research, for example) and affirms that his definition "will encompass that which is defined as fiction literature". Ohmann seeks to separate the definition of literature from literary work, but also to address the problem of fiction. It his article, he pursues the nearest neighbor to literature on the knowledge map, and considers history to be a candidate, because:

> All existing literary work was written in the past. As such, it is within the historian's mission, and literary works provide some of our richest understan-dings of the past. Also, we need some knowledge of history --at least the history of language-- in order to make decent literary critiques (Ohmann, 1971).

However, this was ruled out rapidly, as defining literature as part of history presents a number of difficulties:

> There are two difficulties, which, when observed together, disqualify history as the gene shared by literature as a member of the species. If the principal characteristic of history is the past, it encompasses the data of ALL empirical studies: each chemical reaction observed that has taken place in the past. On the other hand, if the principal characteristic of history is fluidity -- the way in which events and situations occurred and became other events (and this seems wise to say about history) -- then literature fits poorly into this province of the cognitive map. For consumers of literature, it holds both interest and affectiveness, to a large extent, owing to its unique qualities, which differentiates it from other literary work and non-literary events. When readers perceive literary work as a community, it tends to be timeless. Neither chronology, nor historical causes and effects, nor evolution are distinctive aspects of literature. Regardless of the affinities between literature and history, one does not include the other, except in cases of relatives of little social illustration (Ohmann, 1971).

Ohmann's assertion is absolutely true, the literature cannot tell us much about history as a discipline, and in doing so, it would exclude the group of literature that he wishes to salvage, that of fiction literary work. It is not just that which Ohmann wishes to highlight when he speaks about history. He also disqualifies arguments proposed in literature as historiographic instruments. While it is true that there is literature about history (literature that studies history), this definition would leave to the side all literary work that does not discuss history, a significant number of books to be discarded.

Ohmann's next move was to consider psychology the most common trait among literary work, given that without a mind that interprets, the it serve as no more than lines on paper. However, just like history, psychology was too broad a discipline by which to define literary work.

Following rejection of those elements, Ohmann opted to approach literature as a mental entity because it is the linguistic entity itself.

> Among the many things that literary work is, one thing is irredeemably made of language. More specifically: discourse, in the broadest sense of the term, which includes all forms of discourse and writing that emerge, uninterrupted, from a single communicator or writer. To summarize, of all those events, I will say that discourse is the gene of literature (Ohmann, 1971).

This step is fundamental for the reconstruction of the bridge that should exist between linguistics and literary work, given that Ohmann redirects the analysis of literary work toward the pragmatic magnifying glass, defining this as a type of discourse, and not as a special entity in which linguistic grammatical rules are suspended, as defined by Terry Eagleton (1998). This type of literary discourse has various discursive rules that govern it, and as such, properties of language must be used, as in all discourse.

Literary work and its reference capacity

The second part of Austin's critique is tied to the referential function of language, as in literary discourse, dialogues refer to entities and characters based on the work itself, or on fictitious things and people. The work does not really refer thereto, but imitates this capacity using ordinary language as a reference.

Ohmann also opines on the matter, on identifying forms of reference that lead us to the real world, and back to the world of the literary work:

> Many words in ordinary discourse lack postulated references, owing to this restricted notion of reference. I have in mind not only the non-categorematic words such as «for» and not only rarities such as «chimera», but also common places such as «mailbox" in «I can't find a mailbox in the entire city». Second, many words in literature do refer to the usual meaning. One novel begins saying that «Everyone was on Charing Street» or «I met Jack Kennedy in November of '46» and «Charing Street», «Jack Kennedy», and «November of '46» have their usual references (Ohmann, 1971).

This is another very important step in the reconstruction of the bridge between literary and linguistic work, given that the double fault in the reference argument presented by Austin shows the way in which people's daily communication also makes use of words that have no real-world reference (words such as unicorn, elf, or chimera), and literary work does make use of real-world references (as in the Jack Kennedy example). With this problem resolved, and with this literary work as a type of discourse, it is possible to study literature from the standpoint of pragmatics.

Ohmann's work concludes by showing that literature uses speech acts, through what is called "special mimesis", a process in which the reader must test their competency as a decipherer of speech acts, in order to understand the literary work from that point of view. However, Ohmann's analysis is limited to that of a short poem[3], and cannot apply the satisfaction criteria that he himself imposes on his definition of literature, given the length of the poem (two lines). Further, his assertion regarding mimesis may leave more questions than answers, as it is so similar to Austin's critique. Ohmann closes the gap, declaring that: "saying that a literary work does not contain declarations, commands, promises, or similar things, I am not saying that the conditions to declare, order, and promise are irrelevant for sentences in literature, but rather that they are relevant in a special sense: on leaving mimesis to take its place" (Ohmann, 1971).

In other words, Ohmann believes that the rules for literary work to make declarations, promises, commands, and other things are given. However, without improved criteria or arguments, it is unable, really, to do these things. Instead, it delimits ways to do these things, by way of that which he calls "special mimesis"[4]. Again, this mimesis is similar to

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3   In June, in the midst of the golden countryside, I saw a dead marmot (Richard Eberhart).

4   "One may say that a literary work is mimetic in one special sense: it imitates not only an action (Aristotelic term), but an infinitely detailed scenario for its cuasi-speech acts.

the idea of Austin, and so one feels frustrated by this conclusion after so many arguments were presented against it.

A pragmatic view of literature, Pratt's proposal

It is here that the viewpoint of Mary Louise Pratt is so captivating. In contrast to the theoretical currents derived from Russian formalism, and from formalism itself, Mary Louise Pratt presents a new viewpoint of the relationship between literary and ordinary language. For her, "Linguistic and literary critique are in the same city, on the same day, but in different hotels" (1977). For her, linguistics and literary critique still have not found common ground that would cause them to grow intertwined, but has rather caused them to separate. Pratt blames formalism for this distance, since formalists separated literary from ordinary language, and treat them as two mutually exclusive entities, and have failed to provide sufficient evidence to support such a categorical division. Said division is the reason that literary analysis lost its linguistic focus, and generated a large number of proposals for the study of literature, although none of these, she says, "is able to include the phenomenon of literature as a whole".

In accordance with the line drawn by Ohmann, Pratt believes that one must study literary work as a type of discourse. As such, it may be seen as a subject of analysis by the same theories that form the linguistic pragmatics corpus. Thus, in her work *Toward a speech act theory of literary discourse* (Indiana, 1977), Pratt seeks an analysis scheme that includes literary work content and elucidates on those points in which Ohmann left us unsatisfied, so as to learn the mimetic and referential capacity of literary work. Pratt shows that it is even possible to address literary work on two levels: a macro level (treating the entire work as a single speech act), and a micro level (studying each dialogue therein, as one would in ordinary communication).

One of the first things that Pratt wishes to change is the fact that we call the language of daily communication "ordinary language", as for her, this is the language from which all other uses emerge, and so she prefers the term "natural language". Here, she distances herself from the bases created by Russian formalism.

Secondly, she accepts the postulates of Ohmann, when he refers to the referential capacity of literary work to attack a fictional argument, such as hampering pragmatic analysis. Additionally, however, she reinforces this from a new point of view, offering additional criteria with which to study a literary work, criteria imposed by Paul Grice (1982) with his conversational maxims. A basic summary of these may be found in an article published in the past in this same journal (Buitrago-Osorio, 2019):

The maximum quantity. Its goal is to restrict the amount of information proffered in the communicative exchange, by way of two guidelines:

✓ That their contribution contains the information required.

✓ That their contribution not contain more information than that required.

The maxim of quality (of veracity). This invites us to speak solely of what we are sure of, by way of two rules.

- ✓ Not affirming that which you believe to be false.

- ✓ Not affirming anything that lacks sufficient proof.

The maxim of relation (of relevance): That what is discussed opportunely is relevant.

The maxim of mode (modality, fundamentally intent on being clear):

- ✓ Avoiding unclear expression.

- ✓ Avoiding ambiguity.

- ✓ Being brief.

- ✓ Being organized.

The maxims are also prone, then, to being disobeyed (violated, in the terms of Grice) the violations of maxims cause what Grice calls *implicatures*, which are as follows:

i)   Covert violation.

ii)   Open suppression.

iii)   Conflict or collision.

iv)   Open violation.

Sometimes, we fail to comply with a maxim because we are unfamiliar with (i) or refuse to follow it. For example, not wishing to participate in the conversation, as required, and (ii) where the principle of cooperation is also unfulfilled. We may also, as speakers, be forced to choose to follow one maxim and break another knowingly, when, for example, we cannot continue to discuss a case, for lack of sufficient proof of its veracity. Lastly, (iv) ignore, as speakers, a maxim, and do so on purpose. Here, the most common speaker reaction is to attempt to reconcile the principle of cooperation, imagining that we meant to say something else.

For many, the more problematic concept of maxims is that of quantity. Grice admits that it is not bad to provide a great deal of information, in pro of a better situational context, but it is necessary to be aware of this, so as to not lose sight of the objective of the conversation, or deviate the discussion at some point. This is also of special importance within the relationship regarding literary study, as arrival to a point at which one classifies the amount of information as excessive is entirely subjective, and many times enters into conflict with the maxim of relevance (that it be relevant). As such, one may, in reality, give a number of unknown, but sufficient, details.

Let us stop to think for a moment, to clarify the link that exists between these conversational maxims and the writing action, as said process follows similar rules. In the broad spectrum of understanding the relationship between pragmatics and literature, Grice's maxims play a fundamental role. It seems that the argumentative line of a book, as in the plot, makes use of an adapted version of Grice's maxims, and the author may use the *implicatures* to clarify their intention therein. They may apply, for example, repetition in a novel or poem, which achieves its goal by way of the violation of the quantity or mode maxims.

Conversational maxims, thus, form a pillar in the study of pragmatics, as with these guidelines, discourse analysis work becomes clearer and easier to perform. It creates a classification scheme that is vital for the comprehension of the way in which the communicative process occurs, how this occurs in the most pleasant way possible, and without falling into its *implicatures* (Buitrago-Osorio, 2019).

For Pratt, it is quite obvious that literary discourse analysis may occur in light of these maxims, but she has one more up her sleeve: that of Labov's conversational narratives (1972).

Recall that Labov developed, in 1972, a structure common to all conversational narratives.

Language of the city

Abstract	Make a summary of the events to be included in the narration, or evaluate event significance.
Orientation	Present the scenario, characters, and contextual details relevant to the narration.
Complication	The series of narrative clauses that reveal the most important details contained in the chronology of events.
Evaluation	The end (goal/objective) of telling the story is revealed, as is the purpose of the narration, and the reason the speaker narrated (may occur at the end or at the climax of the story, i.e. at the time in which the narration's relevance is made evident or explicit).
Result/resolution	The end of the series of events that composes the narration.
Coda	Element that indicates the narration's end, which may tie the time of narration to the present.

Source: Labov (1972)

Labov proposes this scheme to exemplify the way in which a conversational narrative is divided. This type of scheme is often repeated, while someone is telling a story to another person. On evaluation of said story, it is found that the words used to arrive to one part or another of the scheme vary, but the form and idea remain the same.

According to Pratt, if the work is a type of discourse, and linguistics provides means for discourse study, one may make use of all those tools available for the analysis of literary work.

Below, Dostoyevsky's short story, *White nights*, will be analyzed with the Pratt proposal, which includes the application of those concepts from Austin, Ohmann, and Grice, mentioned above, and the model that Labov created for the study of conversational narratives will also be applied.

White nights, from the standpoint of pragmatics

White nights is a story written by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, published in 1804, in his early career. It tells the story of its protagonist for four nights, during the summer solstice. During this period, darkness is not absolute, which inspired the white nights title.

The protagonist is a young man, overwhelmed by solitude and by people. He enjoys the empty landscapes of the city, is simultaneously tired of people, and hates that they do not recognize him. During this time, he meets a young woman, Nastenka, with whom he shares conversations the following nights, and with whom he falls in love, in an attempt to overcome his loneliness. At the end, however, she leaves, as a suitor of hers returns after having been away a year, and leaves our protagonist condemned to disaffection and the isolation of un-requited love.

It is important to understand the context mentioned in the above paragraph, because, just as occurs in day-to-day communication, that which characters say cannot be separate from the context in which it is said. In the story, as in real life, those who intervene in the communicative situation consider the weight of the words, actions, and know what they say and do (as demonstrated by Eniko Bollobás in his article entitled *Speech acts in literature,* in 1980). The repercussions of that said by the characters depends on the story's plot, and for this reason, White Nights may lend a clear panorama of the way in which dialogues guide the development of character situations.

Firstly, the protagonist defines himself as a solitary person: "From early morning I had been oppressed by a strange despondency. It suddenly seemed to me that I was lonely, that everyone was forsaking me and going away from me" (p. 3). His declaration may be verified later in the same passage, by the way in which he refers to people and the city, which also complies with the conditions of an expressive realizative action. Further, the formulation of said declaration, of course, has a purpose for reader and story both. The reader is informed of the protagonist's mood, and the story serves to construct its atmosphere of melancholy and solitude that the author seeks to transmit. It is thus a sincere declaration, and a speech act with intention, that seeks to produce a reaction.

Declarations such as this are abundant in the remainder of the story: "I was even ashamed for feeling offended and sad" (p. 13), there are guidelines such as when the protagonist saves Nastenka from a gentleman harassing her, and he says: "Give me your arm" (p. 16) so that the man would not approach, and this, which has an intention, is recognized by the girl: "She took my arm without a word, still trembling with excitement and terror" (p. 16).

These are just a few examples of the way in which, in literary work, there are assertions, declarations, and commands, in the same way as there are in natural language, and how they act in the same way as they do in day-to-day speech. However, one must move to a broader spectrum to apply Grice's maxims to the plot.

In the first part, the first night, the narrator insists on his loneliness as he walks the city, and how he prefers city things to city people. One may observe said insistence in sentences such as: "For though I had been living almost eight years in Petersburg I had hardly an acquaintance" (p. 3), or "that was why I felt as though they were all deserting me when all Petersburg packed up and went to its summer villa" (p. 3), "They, of course, do not know me, but I know them" (p. 4), and in the conversation with Nastenka on the bridge, "...Why, tell me, Nastenka, why is it conversation is not easy between the two friends? Why is there no laughter? Why does no lively word fly from the tongue of the perplexed newcomer [...] Why does the gentleman,

all at once remembering some very necessary business which never existed, suddenly seize his hat and hurriedly make off, snatching away his hand from the warm grip of his host, who was trying his utmost to show his regret and retrieve the lost position? (p. 50). Parts such as the above demonstrate the loneliness of the protagonist, and, from the viewpoint of Grice's maxims. It complies with the goals proposed, except one: that of relevance. The maxim of relevance (that it be relevant) must respond to the question: relevant for whom? The response would be, for the communicative exchange in which he participates, to say, for Grice's principle of cooperation. "Do that required of your contribution at the appropriate time in the communicative exchange in which one participates" (Grice, 1975, p. 43).

Pratt says that the principle of cooperation also serves in literary work, but in a special way, inviting the reader to participate in the story as both hearer and accomplice. Thus, the author may deliberately break with a maxim, in pro of their story, or that which would be, in the case of White Nights, relevant, through repetition. From the repetition of descriptions of the solitude felt by the protagonist, the relevance of this fact for him emerges. His invisible prison torments him, such that he refers to it constantly, further because it leads the reader to think that he does not entirely fit into Saint Petersburg society.

One clearer example of this deliberate violation is shown in the story, during the conversation between the protagonist and Nastenka on the bridge, when he said that he was happy to have met her, and begins a monologue that causes him to digress, in refined lexicon. When Nastenka sees that she has become lost in the conversation, he calls his attention to this, and reminds him of the principle of cooperation: "...-Why, yes, yes," answered Nastenka, "that's the point. Listen. You describe it all splendidly, but couldn't you perhaps describe it a little less splendidly? You talk as though you were reading it out of a book." (p. 25). The protagonist, somewhat angered and somewhat happy tells her that it is very difficult to speak in another way, and please, "And so I beg you not to interrupt me, Nastenka, but listen humbly and obediently, or I will be silent." (p. 27). This clear absence of the maxims of mode and quantity is a reflection of that which Pratt suggests, as a special function of the principle of cooperation, since the protagonist is deliberately violating these two maxims in pro of a third: relevance. However, this relevance is not a synonym for clarity or concision, but to show, by way of his monologue, a reflection upon his life until the moment in which Nastenka speaks, and via this dialogue, the author may persuade the reader to feel empathy for his life story, with which they may be moved or identified, or may view him as strange or odd.

The protagonist is thus generating a reaction in Nastenka, which may be any of the feelings mentioned, and provoking the same in the reader, but in a more general manner. The author is constructing their speech act on a macro level, by way of the sensations left by the entire literary work.

It is possible to perform the same exercise and thus analyze all of the work's dialogues to seek the maxims and violations shown during these. According to Pratt, the fact that this may be done "does not owe to the fact that the literary work imitates real-life dialogues, but rather to the fact that dialogues in the work and real life function in the same way" (p. 135). It is this same function that leads to the conclusion that "if the division between literary and ordinary

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language was as palpable as formalists make it seem, then both languages could be sustained independently, but this is not the case" (p. 68). Clearly, if we remove the scheme of dialogue function in the real world, then those in the literary work would not have their own function to distinguish them, and removing the use of literary expressions and figures from day to day language does not leave us with a clear idea of the difference that formalists wish to demonstrate. As shown by Pratt and Ohmann in their writings, the uses of these expressions and forms are ambivalent. Both literary and natural language are used indiscriminately, in both cases.

A group of evidence in pro of the blurred line that divides these two languages emerges, by way of the application of the scheme of Labov's conversational narratives to the literary work. In an exercise to demonstrate the way in which this occurs in White Nights, the following could be used as an example:

Macro-structure of White nights

Abstract	White nights, sentimental novel (recollections of a dreamer).
Orientation	It was a wonderful night [...] the sky was so starry, so bright [...] From early morning I had been oppressed by a strange despondency [...] I had not been able to lock knowledge with anyone [...]Towards evening I went out for a walk [...] I saw a solitary woman on the bridge, and heard her sob.
Complication	The protagonist rescues Nastenka, takes her to his house, in an outburst to abandon his solitude, invites her to go out with him the following night. On that night, he tells her how lonely he feels, and falls in love with her. She feels the same, but says that she has a suitor who promised to return over a year ago. He asks her whether, if he did not return, she would marry him, and she accepts, but the following night, said suitor returns.
Evaluation	She decides to remain with her suitor and marry him. The protagonist has his heart broken, and is embraced, once again, by loneliness, and realizes that it makes no sense to run from it, because it is his destiny to be alone. Nastenka takes pity on him and offers bring with them, the happy couple.
Result/ resolution	He thanks her for her offer and returns to his room feeling even more alone, but thanks life for having given him these moments of happiness in his discussions with Nastenka.
Coda	End.

Source: author elaboration

In the interest of brevity, a summary of the narration has been simplified, but taken directly from the literary work. This clarification appears under the title, and illustrates perfectly the central idea thereof, the orientation. In this case, are all descriptions that the protagonist uses to describe his solitude, as in that context the literary work unfolds. Parts that could have been included in this section have been omitted, such as the description of the city, his contempt for people, and the fact that nobody knows him in the streets when he walks, during which he loses himself. The purpose of this orientation ends when his day to day is interrupted by Nastenka, the new being who will offer him moments of relief and happiness.

The complication of actions, evaluations, and conclusions are very clear in the literary work, as it is the protagonist himself who arrives to these premises and resolutions. After testing the waters of love, in his own way, his broken heart is obligated to return to its initial state of

solitude, having learned how it feels from the other side. Finally, it is common in literary work that the coda, or end of the narration that returns us to reality, is one or two words, such as "End", or "the End", used most in English.

It is clear that, if the literary work can generally be classified within this scheme, other stories within the same work may classify as well. The same scheme, then, may serve to exemplify this monologue about the life of the dreamer.

Monologue microstructure

Abstract	You will hear that, in those corners (corners of the city), strange people live: dreamers.
Orientation	The dreamer—if you want an exact definition—is not a human being, but a creature of an intermediate sort. For the most part he settles in some inaccessible corner, as though hiding from the light of day; once he slips into his corner, he grows to it like a snail, or, anyway, he is in that respect very much like that remarkable creature, which is an animal and a house both at once, and is called a tortoise. Why do you suppose he is so fond of his four walls, which are invariably painted green, grimy, dismal and reeking unpardonably of tobacco smoke?
Complication the actions:	Why does this absurd person meet him with such embarrassment, changing countenance and overcome with confusion, as though he had only just committed some crime within his four walls; as though he had been forging counterfeit notes, or as though he were writing verses to be sent to a journal with an anonymous letter, in which he states that the real poet is dead, and that his friend thinks it his sacred duty to publish his things? Why, tell me, Nastenka, why is it conversation is not easy between the two friends? Why is there no laughter? Why does no lively word fly from the tongue of the perplexed newcomer, who at other times may be very fond of laughter, lively words, conversation about the fair sex, and other cheerful subjects?
Evaluation	And why does this friend, probably a new friend and on his first visit—for there will hardly be a second, and the friend will never come again—why is the friend himself so confused, so tongue-tied, in spite of his wit (if he has any), as he looks at the downcast face of his host, who in his turn becomes utterly helpless and at his wits' end after gigantic but fruitless efforts to smooth things over and enliven the conversation, to show his knowledge of polite society, to talk, too, of the fair sex, and by such humble endeavour, to please the poor man, who like a fish out of water has mistakenly come to visit him? Why does the gentleman, all at once remembering some very necessary business which never existed, suddenly seize his hat and hurriedly make off, snatching away his hand from the warm grip of his host, who was trying his utmost to show his regret and retrieve the lost position?
Result/ resolution	Why does the friend chuckle as he goes out of the door, and swear never to come and see this queer creature again, though the queer creature is really a very good fellow, and at the same time he cannot refuse his imagination the little diversion of comparing the queer fellow's countenance during their conversation with the expression of an unhappy kitten treacherously captured, roughly handled, frightened and subjected to all sorts of indignities by children, till, utterly crestfallen, it hides away from them under a chair in the dark, and there must needs at its leisure bristle up, spit, and wash its insulted face with both paws, and long afterwards look angrily at life and nature, and even at the bits saved from the master's dinner for it by the sympathetic housekeeper?
Coda	For I have known you for ages, Nastenka, because I have been looking for someone for ages, and that is a sign that it was you I was looking for, and it was ordained that we should meet now.

Source: author elaboration

The monologue follows the anecdote of a visit that the protagonist received once, and whose end was hurried, given his living conditions. This anecdote, told with rhetorical ques-

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tions, functions just as a story that could be told to a friend in real life, as shown by the fact that it may be exemplified with the Labov scheme. Pratt's work may be subversive for this reason, given the changes that they try to introduce to the panorama of theory and literary critique, and in the world of linguistic pragmatics, on uniting, by way of existing schemes in the study and analysis of discourse, structures and texts characteristic of literary texts. This may be the path for serious pragma literature, which studies the behavior or literary work in its relationship with language, via the use thereof, with the intentions of characters and their relationship with the author.

Conclusions

Literary work and day-to-day language may have more in common than not.

One must consider voices such as that of Ohmann and Pratt, so as to blur the division between ordinary and literary language.

Theories and linguistic pragmatics concepts may be applied to literary work, to treat it as a type of discourse, and not as a separate entity that functions with different, elaborate clauses.

The author and characters of literary works use conversational *implicatures,* such that their intention is comprehended more precisely, using the information omission or intentional repetition mechanisms.

The fact that the existence of speech acts may be demonstrated in literature, and that these may be analyzed in the same way as in pragmatics, enables a literary analysis approach with a communicative hue, which may reflect new standards for literary work.

Accepting that the fictitious content of literary work does not affect the properties of language permits viewing this as having fulfilled the same functions, and shows the way in which dialogue function is the same as in ordinary language.

It is not the aim of this document to criticize Russian formalism. Its advances in the literary field have been of great help for prior academic production, but the division that was formulated between these types of language (the day-to-day and the literary) falters monumentally when confronted with the arguments exemplified herein. As such, the reframing of this division is a natural, evidence-based conclusion. It presupposes a metamorphosis in the world of theory and literary critique, but will shed light on new findings that may have passed undetected with other analysis schemes, as this represents only the beginning of what may be a pragma literature that yields innovative conclusions.

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