Literary work and ordinary language, two sides of the same coin

Luis Armando Buitrago Osorio[1]

Abstract

This article pretends to make a quick review through the principal theories of pragmatics, also to show some of the most relevant points of view in terms of literary criticisim and literary theory; this with the purpose of having tools to show that it is possible to make a pragmatic analysis on the field of literature, so concepts that were already taken as correct on the differences between ordinary language and literary language are only apparent differences, based on the usage that language receives during specific situations. In this way, various authors will be cited from both fields, pragmatics and literature, to make possible the construction of a way that can help as an illustrative form to show a new perspective that seems now forgotten, pragma literature, it's relevance and it's development will be vital to look for a way of approaching literary analysis from a more communicative point of view.

Keywords: Pragmatics; Literature; Ordinary language; Literary language; Linguistics; Speech act; Conversational maxim.

1. Introduction

Pragmatics is a relatively new discipline that focuses on studying what its sisters, semantics and semiotics seem to leave to the field of obviousness. Pragmatics is responsible for studying the use that people give to language in a specific context. In other words, pragmatics studies *how* language *is used* and *for what* purpose it is used.

The fact that we use language for different things now seems to be taken for granted, part of reality; but in the first half of the last century, this idea emerged as something revolutionary, and grew with a force that can be defined as transformative. Renewing for the philosophy of the moment, which was focused on the logical analysis of language, and determined to show that language could only function in a completely logicalistic way; and for linguistics that is greatly influenced by Saussure's work on the differentiation between language, language and speech, and on the internal and external levels of language

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1   Bachelor´s Degree in Modern Languages from the Universidad de Caldas. Master in Philosophy from the Universidad de Caldas. Assigned, as a Teacher, to the Department of Linguistics and Literature of the University of Caldas. Email: labtago@gmail.com

Roughly speaking, Russell's work in his work On Denoting (1905) focused on showing that all parts of a sentence (article, subject, verb, adverb and so on) worked together to build a atoms together stated with meaning, but that said statement could be true or false:

Consider now the proposition "all men are mortal". This proposition is really hypothetical and says that if something is a man, it is mortal. That is, it expresses that if x is a man, x is mortal, whatever x is. Thus, substituting "x is human" for "x is a man", we find: "All men are mortal" means "'if x is human, x is mortal' is always true" (Russell, 1905, p. 481).

And his argument is strongly based on symbolic logic and mathematics for a very clear reason, philosophy at that time was trying to overcome metaphysical language through the use of logic and logical analysis of the internal structure of language, the grammatical functioning

However, this theory warned of great difficulty given its commitment to divide the statements into true or false, and this problem came to light with the now classic example "the current king of France is bald" analyzed by Russell himself, to demonstrate the falsehood of the statements, given that, in the absence of a current king of France, the statement was false. "If the object does not exist, or if it is not unique, then the whole sentence is neither meaningless nor true, but false" (Russell, 1905, p. 7). The difficulty was, as you well then highlighted Strawson in his article *About refer* (1950), in that while prayer may seem false, depends on a very important factor, the context.

If someone from the 15th century said it, or wrote it, then it referred to a specific person, different from someone who had said or written it a century earlier, and its truthfulness or falsehood resided exclusively in the verification of whether said king was or not bald. So, if it is said now or at some point after the French revolution, when it lacks a reference (there is no current king of France) then "the phrase fails to refer, so it is neither true nor false, but meaningless" (Strawson, 1950, p. 63).

These steps of philosophy showed how language also had, or made use of, contextual needs. In pragmatics and in our lives, the context plays a decisive role in how we communicate with others, our registration can vary from one context to another, a work meeting, a love date, a chat with friends or a surrender of After all, each of these situations requires us a kind of way of speaking.

These different ways of speaking had already been taken into account before, at the time when Wittgenstein, the second Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations reaffirmed the concept of language games. Basically Wittgenstein's idea about language games, part of all the analysis he does in his Philosophical Investigations about the power of the different uses of a sentence and the variable power of its propositional content. In this regard, he states that:

> Frege compares the concept with an area and says: a delimited area without clarity could not be called an area at all. This probably means that we could not do anything with it. But, it makes no sense to say: <Stop here approxima-

tely!>? Imagine that I was with another in a square and said that. While I do it, I don›t even draw a limit, but perhaps I make an ostentatious movement with my hand — as if I showed him a certain point. And that›s exactly how it is explained what a game is. Examples are given and they are intended to be understood in a certain sense. —But with this expression I don›t want to say: he must now see in these examples the common thing that I — for some reason — could not express. But: he must now use these examples in a certain way. Exemplification is not here an indirect means of explanation - in the absence of a better one. Well, any general explanation can be misunderstood. Thus, we play precisely the game (I mean the language game with the word <game> (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 71).

Many philosophers still have problems with Wittgenstein's philosophy, partly because the philosophy is very critical of itself for a rigor in knowledge, partly because many philosophers tend to look at the study of natural language philosophy with some misgivings. , when considering it of little importance for philosophy; it must be remembered that until the first half of the twentieth century the language of symbolic logic and its application to natural language were studied to make it an entirely logical one. The fact is that Wittgenstein himself was so rigorous with himself that he radically changed his ideas over the years, concluding that his first work, the Tractatus, was not the most successful. Reason for talking about a first and second Wittgenstein.

[...] Then it seemed to me suddenly that I should publish those old and new thoughts together, that they could only receive their correct illumination with the contrast and in the background of my old way of thinking. Well, since sixteen years ago I began to take up philosophy again, I had to acknowledge serious errors in what I had signed in that first book (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 6).

The rectification helped Wittgenstein see the hidden potential of words in ordinary discourse; As he well proposes, we act under different contextual rules, we know what to do and what not to do in certain places, and in the same way we know how to speak and how not to speak in certain places, what words to choose and which ones to avoid. In that sense, pigeonholeing the different uses of language, the different language games, becomes a completely different task from what Russell had thought of in his logical atomism, as Strawson put it well with his example of the king of France.

However, the concept of language games, perhaps because of the same impediments mentioned above, was not very well received within the philosophical tradition. It must be understood that the idea of language play, as Wittgenstein proposed, refers to the fact that when we use language, we are part of a rule-driven event, such as poker, where we can develop using the "card set", only in this case, the "set" of letters that Wittgenstein refers to is the unlimited set of words that we have at our disposal to play, how we use it and for what, it shows the ability of language to shape the reality of the world . Saying: "Pass me the butter" and say "Could you be so kind as to pass me the butter?" Not only do they say a lot about the kind of person speaking, but it depends on the context, the intonation and

the way it is said. This seems to be a good point to introduce the role that these elements have in pragmatics.

Thus, the role of the context did not go unnoticed by the philosophers who read these works and, in 1955, John Austin participates in a series of conferences under the readings of pragmatist William James at Harvard University, conferences that revolved around to the study of language in context and, specifically, to something that is known today as an act of speech and that Austin grouped into the concept of an illocutive act. These conferences were published in 1962 under the title of *How to do things with words* Of the same; Pragmatics was established as a formal discipline showing that our linguistic preferences, what we say, have a decisive role in the development of any situation in everyday life, that we can, without a doubt, do things with words, as evidenced below.

2. The development of linguistic pragmatics

2.1. Austin and formal communication

Austin warns that when we talk and participate in a conversation, we simultaneously perform three actions in which every broadcast can be divisible; an act of consecutive speech, an act of ilocutive speech and an act of periodic speech.

The act of consecutive speech is the simple utterance of sounds through our sounding device, one of the characteristics that defines us is to possess and make use of the ability to speak.

> I call the act of <saying something>, in this full and normal meaning, to perform a locutionary act and I call the study of expressions, to that extent and in those respects, study of the locutions, or of the units complete discourse (Austin, 1982, Conference VIII, p. 62).

This speech act has in turn two subcategories, the act of speech and the act of speech. Phhatic is defined as the production of a series of sounds belonging to a particular language. The rhetoric is found if the production of those sounds of that language actually makes sense in that language.

> The <phatic> act consists in the emission of certain terms or words, that is, noises of certain types, considered as belonging to a vocabulary, and insofar as they belong to it, and as appropriate to a certain grammar, and insofar as they are adapted to she. The <rhetic> act is to perform the act of using those terms with a certain meaning and reference, more or less defined (Austin, 1982. Conference VIII, p. 62).

The act of ilocutive speech is perhaps the most controversial of the three elements, but for now it can be defined as the intention with which we carry our message, so that what we say and what is meant are really different things. "That is, to perform an act by saying

something, as a different thing from performing the act of saying something" (Austin, 1962, p. 5).

Here again, we must refer to the concept of Wittgenstein's language games given the multiplicity of meanings that a single broadcast can have, without context help to understand each other; in other words, the act of ilocutive speech, the intention of the speaker printed on the message, tests the listener's communicative abilities to understand what the speaker meant.

> The difficulty lies rather in the number of different senses of an expression as vague as <how are we - using - the phrase>. That is why, to be in this language game, you must play with the tools available such as context, the act of speech (the intonation of the broadcast, for example) and the rhetoric. Finally, there is an act of perlocutional speech, which authorizes listeners to take the role of interpreters, and to assume a certain position in front of what they have just heard from the speaker, that reaction that the message produces in them is the perlocutionary act. . Often, and even normally, saying something will produce certain consequences or effects on the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of who emits the expression, or of other people. And it is possible that when we say something we do it with the purpose, intention or design of producing such effects [...]. We will call the performance of such an act the performance of a perlocutionary or perlocution act (Austin, 1982, p. 66).

It is clear then that any statement that occurs in a specific context will have these three acts simultaneously, it will be a proference in a language (consecutive act) charged with an intention on the part of the speaker (ilocutive act) and that he plans to produce a reaction in the listening or in the auditorium (perlocutionary act). Austin's work focused on classifying the ways speech acts should be performed, his research formalized the ways in which speakers of a language express themselves to reach an end (promise, threaten, forgive, break, among other acts of speaks; each one has a way of becoming defined).

As mentioned earlier, Austin defined the characteristics that must exist for a speech act to be a <lucky> act as he called it "Let's first try to state schematically - and I don't intend to attribute definitive character to this scheme - any of the things that are necessary for the <lucky> or unobstructed operation of a realizer"(Austin, 1982, p. 11). A performance act should be understood as a speech act that has the ability to do things in our daily lives, they are the clearest example that we can really do things with words. These characteristics are:

> A1) does it correctly (usually the boats are baptized by crashing a bottle of champagne); A2) is the right person to do so and has the recognition of the others of said authority B1) everyone is accepting that said boat is being baptized with such name by the person indicated and remain silent while the words are pronounced by him B2) that whoever does it is complying with the proper procedure to do it, that is, does it correctly, does not crash the bottle before

> saying the words G1) that the authorized person (the mayor for example) has the behavioral attitude that the situation deserves and is not, for example, drunk and G2) everyone knows their role in that ceremony, when to clap and celebrate and when to remain silent (Austin, 1962, p. 54).

In this way, social procedures require a precise intervention regarding our actions, and such procedures must be so that they are accepted by those who attend or participate; to exemplify, the one that someone in a ceremony says: "I baptize this ship with the name of Lolita", represents a contextual situation in which we assume that whoever says it has: A,1) does it correctly (usually boats are baptized by crashing a bottle of champagne); A,2) is the right person to do so and has the recognition of others of that authority; B,1) everyone is accepting that said ship is being baptized with such name by the indicated person and remain silent while the words are spoken by him; B.2) that whoever does it is complying with the proper procedure to do it, that is, doing it correctly, does not crash the bottle before saying the words; G,1) that the authorized person (the mayor for example) has the behavioral attitude that the situation merits and is not, for example, drunk; and G,2) everyone knows their role in this ceremony, when to clap and celebrate and when to remain silent.

This is the case in religious celebrations, family social events, political events, participation in debates, and so on. In case of not complying with these rules, then it will be the territory of what Austin called Misfortunes, violations of behavioral rules, which have different penalties.

A mistake, as stated by Austin (1962) is a failure in the procedure already established so that speech acts are fortunate, said mistake will produce a null act that can be of the form A or B, the bad appeals (form A) they occur due to the lack of the following elements: A,1: there must be a conventional procedure that has a certain conventional effect and that procedure must include the issuance of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and in addition; A,2: the particular persons and circumstances of the case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure to which it is appealed. If, on the contrary, the null act is caused by bad appeals (form B) it must be because the procedure was not followed as shown in: B,1: the procedure must be executed by all participants and B,2: completely.

But misfortunes can also be due to abuses of the procedure, when the procedure is not performed properly by the audience or who performs it; is called hollow act to the procedural abuses of class Γ, as shown, such hollow acts occur if not met: Γ 1: when the procedure is intended to be used by people who have certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain subsequent conduct by any participant, then a person "in" and therefore invokes "the" procedure, must have those thoughts or feelings and participants must have the intention to conduct themselves of that mode and, in addition Γ, 2: they must effectively conduct themselves in that way.

Given this description for granted, of how the social procedures that are developed in everyday life should be carried out, we must also mention one of Austin›s statements that is the theoretical basis of this work, his position regarding literature. For Austin:

> […] <there are parasitic> uses of language that are not <serious> or do not cons-
> titute their full normal use. Normal reference conditions may be suspended or
> any attempt to carry out a typical perlocutionary act may be absent, any attempt
> to get my interlocutor to do something (1982, p. 196).

Within these parasitic uses of language, it is possible to state all statements where the speaker suspends all perlocutional effects in the message, and, as the timeless situation of literature is clear (a literary work can be read at any time in history) Austin thinks that the perlocutive act is suspended, the effects on who receives the message or are not clear, or do not exist.

A fundamental work in literary pragmatics, then, will have to find a definition of literature that relies on linguistic pragmatics, since Austin's contribution to speech acts is essential to make a literary study from linguistic pragmatics, since acts Consecutive, ilocutive and perlocutive speech are also identifiable factors from the literary point of view. So first we will have to find a different position from Austin regarding literature.

The publication of *How to do things with words* is done posthumously, Austin dies at the age of 49 and with it, the opportunity to delve deeper into his theory is also lost, because there was still much to do in his theory scope and forms of speech acts ilocutivos. Luckily, John Searle continues with this theory broadening its horizon to the point of the nonverbal, and gives structure and conditions of satisfaction to the ilocutive force of the message. Searle has an opinion similar to Austin's regarding literature.

2.2. John Searle and the ilocutive force

The notion of speech act will also be vital for the study of Searle, for whom not only the words but also the actions have an ilocutive framework for the interpreter. However, Searle carries out further the study of the ilocutive acts raised by Austin, whose terms will also be useful for the purpose of this writing.

For Searle an ilocutive act is charged with an intention, of course, but that intention is directly linked to the linguistic form. That is to say, the act of speaking of a mandate is linked to the linguistic form of the imperative, with this Searle wants to differentiate the ilocutive force from the propositional content, "a proposition is not an act, although the act of expressing a proposition is a part of the performance of certain ilocutionary acts" (Searle, 1992, p. 24). That is, the proposition by itself does not carry an ilocutive force, as does the utterance of it in a given context. In addition, like Austin, Searle recognizes that there are rules for ilocutionary acts, "to perform an ilocutionary act is to take part in a form of behavior governed by rules" (Searle, 1992, p. 32) and that the meaning of the act of ilocutive speech is subject to a series of rules of a conventional and social order, that it is not enough with the mere intention to wait for others to understand the message, but that said message must comply with a series of conditions that he called conditions of sa-tisfaction of the ilocutive acts:

i) Conditions of propositional content: The significant characteristics of the proposition used to carry out the speech act. To thank, the propositional content must refer to a past act done by the listener.

ii)Preparatory conditions: those that must be given so that it makes sense to perform the act ilocutivo. When ordering someone to pay attention, you must have some kind of authority over that person, and it is also necessary that you were not paying attention sooner.

iii) Conditions of sincerity: they refer to the psychological state of the speaker, they express what the speaker feels or should feel when performing the act illocutive. Regardless of whether the act is sincere or insincere, that is, whether or not the speaker has the expressed psychological state.

iv) Essential conditions: It refers to the accomplishment of the act that was intended to be carried out, that is, they take care that said emission is done correctly (Searle, 1965, p. 384).

For Searle it is important that these conditions are met implicitly: what we say, and what we mean can be very different things, if for the purpose of receiving more air in a room with closed windows we say someone near a "it's hot , Right?" Note that at no time are we really consulting the listener for his opinion on the temperature, and although he can share it, he will be persuaded to open the window thanks to the perlocutional effect, and that he has indeed received and understood the illocutive message of the proposition, it is enough to say that it depends on the context if the ilocutive act generates the perlocutive act in the listening, of whether he achieved his intention, either to persuade, or intimidate or deceive or make the other person proud with what he says.

As for Austin, for Searle literary discourse lacks ilocutive force; the actor of the fictional narratives "retends to be" was speaking. It does not recognize any particular feature in the literature, but it is one more type of discourse.

[...] there is no feature or set of features that all works of literature have in common and that could constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions to be a work of literature. Literature, to use Wittgenstein's terminology, is a notion of familiar appearance [...] is the name of a set of attitudes we take towards a portion of the discourse, not the name of an internal property of that portion of the discourse. [...] the literary is a continuum with the non-literary. Not only is a distinctive limit missing, but there are almost no limits (Searle, 1984, p. 25).

Although not assimilating fiction and literature, Searle analyzes the concept of fiction. Fiction is a non-serious use of language that raises the question that, with the same words and the same type of discourse that ordinary discourse is used, it does not seem to perform the same ilocutiva acts.

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> Pretending is an intentional verb: that is, it is one of those verbs that contain within them the concept of intention […] the identifying criterion of whether a text is a work of fiction must necessarily reside in the author's ilocutive intentions. There is no textual, syntactic or semantic property that identifies a text as a work of fiction (Searle, 1979, p. 9).

It is also within the ambitions of this work to discuss these positions and prove otherwise with the help of the same pragmatic theories; The question of the role of fiction in literary work will be dealt with much more precisely in the following chapter, as will the fictional status of literary speech acts and their relation to speech acts of ordinary speech. Again, reaching a consensus will require a much more comfortable position, a position that will provide a definition of literature from the theory of speech acts by John Austin.

It is clear then that, for Searle, it takes more than just the intention in a message for it to be printed and act on the other effectively; a series of factors given precisely is required for the intention to be interpreted correctly. But it took more than just sincerity and authority on the part of the speakers for speech acts to take place satisfactorily.

This vacuum was filled by another theory that will serve to analyze the functioning of literary and ordinary language: the work of Grice *Logic and conversation* (1975); in where will rescue the Theory of cooperation principle and conversational maxims, four principles that help regulate the exchange of information during a conversation.

2.3. Grice and the conversational maxims

Grice was the first to propose a principle of cooperation, different from the notion of satisfaction conditions defended by Searle. While the former deals more with regulating the communicative exchange, the latter sets standards that both context and broadcast must follow in order to make a true communication exchange full of intention. Namely, the principle of cooperation, "[…] make your contribution the one required at the right time of the communicative exchange in which you are participating" (Grice, 1975, p. 43). Draw a line that is optional to follow, rather than a series of rules or instructions to obey (conversational maxims).

The maximum quantity. Its objective is to restrict the amount of information provided in the communicative exchange through two directives.

✓   That your contribution contains as much information as required.

✓   That your contribution does not contain more information than is required

The maximum quality(truthful). This invites us to talk only about what we are safe through two rules:

✓   Do not affirm what you think is false.

✓   Do not affirm anything that does not have sufficient evidence.

The maximum relation(relevant): That what you speak in a timely manner is relevant.

The mode maximum (mode, fundamentally tries to be clear):

- ✓ Avoid expressing yourself darkly.

- ✓ Avoid being ambiguous.

- ✓ Be brief.

- ✓ Be ordered.

The maxims are also prone then to be disobeyed (violated in terms of Grice) violations of the maxims give rise to what Grice calls implicatures that are:

i) Covert violation.

ii) Open deletion.

iii) Conflict or collision.

iv) Open Violation.

Sometimes we breach a maxim for not knowing it (i) or refusing to follow a maxim; for example, by not wanting to participate in the conversation as required (ii) where the principle of cooperation is also breached. We can also, as speakers, be forced to choose to follow a maxim and break another conscientiously (iii), when for example we cannot continue talking about a case because we do not have enough evidence of its truthfulness. And finally (iv) where we make fun of a maxim as speakers, and we do it on purpose, here the most common reaction of the speakers is to try to reconcile the principle of cooperation thinking that we wanted to say something else.

For many, the most problematic concept within the maximum is the maximum quantity. Grice admits that it is not bad to provide a lot of information in favor of a richer situational context, but it is necessary to measure it so as not to lose the objective of the conversation, or lose the interlocutor at some point. This is also of special importance in the relationship it has in front of the literary study, and that reaching a point where one classifies the amount of information as too much is something totally subjective, and often conflicts with the maximum relevance (relevant), for which purpose one can actually give a quantity of unknown but sufficient details.

Just stop to think for a moment to make clear the link between these conversational maxims and the act of writing, since this process follows similar rules. In the broad spectrum in the understanding of the relationship between pragmatics and literature, Grice's maxims are going to play a fundamental role, apparently, the argumentative line of a book as well as the plot, use an adapted version of the maxims of Grice, and the author can use the implicatures to imply his intention with the writing; making use of, for example, the repetition in a novel or in a poem, has a purpose that is achieved through the violation of the maximum *quantity* and *manner*.

The conversational maxims then form a pillar in the study of pragmatics, since with these guidelines the work of discourse analysis becomes clearer and easier to perform, since it

creates a classification scheme that is vital to understand how the communicative process, how to do it in the most enjoyable way and how not to fall into its implications.

The idea is then that these theories of pragmatic study also serve to analyze literary discourse to try to provide a new perspective to literary work, and for this, we must first define the parameters that will be taken into account within the concept of literature as such.

3. Crucial aspects of literary work: towards pragmaliterature

3.1. Literary communication

It will be convenient first to clarify the question: What is a literary work? Nor is it a new question, since despite not having the concept "literature" as such, it can be said that one of the first definitions of the term comes from Aristotle in his poetics, who defined the tragedy as:

> An imitation of a hard and complete action, of a certain extent, in seasoned language, separated each one of the species [of dressings] in the different parts, acting the characters and not by means of story, and that through compassion and fear leads to carry out the purging of such conditions (Aristotle, 335 BC).

Tragedy was the genre of writing par excellence in Aristotle's Greece and therefore a need was born to separate it from other kinds of discourse under the following characteristics:

A) *By means of imitation*, ie, poetic language is seen as a seasoned language, composed verse and song: "I understand 'seasoned language' he who has rhythm, harmony and song, and by 'with the species [of dressings] separately', the fact that some parts are performed only by means of verses, and others, instead, by singing" (Aristotle, 335 ac).

B) *For the purpose of the imitation*, in other words, the purpose of the plot characters' effort, and the way in which their actions lead to the conclusion of the plot.

C) *By the imitation form*, in short, it demands that the performance of the characters must be credible and credible.

D) *For the special* psychological effects of the tragedy, the reaction that the work provokes in the spectators and that allows them to understand their purpose, the tragic catharsis.

These four elements were fundamental for the Russian formalists to make a breakthrough regarding criticism and literary theory; they contributed to distinguish the necessary characteristics so that the literary work could have a literary work status, and the internal mechanisms of its operation. They helped enormously in the search for the apprehension

of literature in conceptual terms. It was the formalists who provided a set of characteristics and formations about what it is, and how to do it? literature. The conclusions of the literary studies of formalism regarding this field focused on seeing literature as a "deviation" from the rules under which language is normally used, a violation of the norm, a violation of the rules of language The same conclusion Austin reaches and when he takes into account that:

1. The study of the communicative use of language takes place in real time.

2. This is because there are a number of factors that influence the intention that words may have.

3. Since things like context, tone of voice, gestures and movements must be combined in the interpretation of the message.

This vision led Russian formalists to conclude that the mechanisms that operate in literature do so only for an aesthetic purpose; that is, the purpose of literary analysis should be found only in the analysis of the way in which the work is written; This form must be dictated by how the author has made use of the figures of discourse within the writing process and how clear it is.

Among the many contributions of formalism is also the sharp division they made between literary language and natural language, which they also called "ordinary"; taking into account how to use both languages. This is something that Professor Mary Louise Pratt (1977) will constantly face in her publication of *Towards a speech act theory of literary discourse* because for her, it is the root of the Austin literature about Searle

The error of the Russian formalists, despite their many advances and the contribution of their vision in terms of literature, was to insist on the sharp division between literary language and natural language, based on the useful application to which both languages seem to refer (Pratt, 1977).

The vision of seeing literature as a violation of the rules and of baptizing its counterpart as ordinary will have two repercussions:

1) Literary works contain a highly language class, that is, their creation requires a tremendously careful selection of words, grammatical, syntactic, semantic structures and literary figures. In other words, formalism conceives all literature as a kind of poetry.

2) This language is only used in literary works, since the language of daily use was called ordinary language. The structures and forms used in the literary work do not appear in daily life.

At the moment, everything seems to indicate then that the statements of Austin and Searle are well founded given the conclusions of the formalist studies, but the first light that Pratt offers in the previous quotation on questioning the division between both languages, as well as seeing them As two totally different things, drives a new vision that seeks to find a meaning of literature that allows to expand the limits of the vision of the analysis of both speeches, literary and natural.

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If literary discourse must be distinguished from non-literary, then it will be necessary to study the aspects of discourse that most influence literary theory to study it. The five aspects mentioned below exist in both discourses, but in different measures, and are in their respective order, the reference, the assertion, the meaning, the emotionality and the structure.

3.2. The referential mode in the literature

Words have the ability to refer (or designate, or denote, differences do not matter in this case). A literary theorist who concentrates on this aspect of language can say that the words in the literary work do not refer, or do not refer in the usual way. This is one of the strongest arguments that theoreticians like Austin use to detract from the role of literary language, as opposed to the possibility of a pragmatic analysis of discourse, since how the referential capacity in the work depends among other things on its characteristic of fictionality, the force of speech seems to diminish; or in Richard's words:

> Only references that are brought up to certain very high and very special combinations, as to correspond to the ways in which things in fact relate. They can be either true or false. And most of the references in poetics are not related in this way (2004, p. 71).

This is the equivalent of the qualification of "parasitic" that Austin gives to literary language, or to the "discoloration" referred to by Searle. For them, literary language loses value of pragmatic analysis given the apparent lack of connection between a referent and a referral outside the world that the book recreates.

Ohmann argues that, although it seems true that it seems to weaken, the same argument fails in the two directions in which it points (literary and natural language):

> There is some truth to it. Even in its simplest form. The name <Mr. Hash> lacks a benchmark of the standard class, like <Brobdingnag>. The definite description <the harlequin> in <the heart of darkness> has a status similar to that of the <current king of France>, and even the demonstrative pronoun <that> in <There is no place for the weak> has been taken from their ordinary reference lines. Even so, the argument fails in both directions. First. Many words in the ordinary discourse lack referents of the class postulated by this notion of such a restricted reference. I have in mind not only sin categoremática words like <for> and not only oddities like <himera> but also common places like <mailbox> in <I can't find a mailbox anywhere in the city> (1971, p. 12).

Thus, Ohmann distorts the supposed advantage that ordinary or natural language has, compared to the literary one. The discourse of natural language is plagued by a number of words that do not seem to designate a reference even in the real world, but rather, that seems to turn to look for a reference in written works.

The other address is exactly the opposite of the previous one. If the first direction is the ability of ordinary language to reference places or non-existent beings, the second direction

refs to the ability of literary language to refer and evoke existing places outside the world of literary work. Ohmann is also clear about this role of literary work:

> Many words in literature do refer in the usual sense. A novel begins by saying <They were all on Charing Street> or <I met Jack Kennedy in November 46> and <Charing Street>, <Jack Kennedy> and <November 46> have their usual references. The novelist is beginning to manufacture his world of 'as if' but does so by pointing to things in the way they normally point (Ohmann, 1971, p. 16).

The contradiction generated by the discoloration argument within the referential capacities within both languages seems to point rather to the need for their own elimination; Mary Louise Pratt dedicates a whole section of her book *Toward a Speech act theory of literary discourse* to talk about the contradiction generated by this argument which she calls "the literary language fallacy" argues that:

> It seems to indicate that the language of the literary work needs to be subject to a series of rules different from those of grammar, making it appear that metaphorical discourse is only typical of literary language. But of course this is false, any utterance, in addition to the rules of grammar, is subject to the rules of the use of the language in question (Pratt, 1977, p. 27).

3.3. The assertive capacity of the work

A second aspect of discourse is its ability to make assertions. If we focus our attention here, we can decide on one of the two definitions of literature; The first, traced to Plato, is that literature is lies. From this conception, one can answer that if the literary work carries in some sense propositional content, then what it asserts or implies is sometimes true, sometimes false, sometimes a mixture of both and sometimes none. As Northrop Frye says. A definition of fiction as falsehood leads to the absurdity that

> [...] a autobiography that arrives at a library would be classified as non-fiction, if the bookseller believes the author, and as fiction if he believes lie. It is difficult to see the use that a literary critic can give this definition (Frye, 1978, p. 136).

The author specifies that it is as rare as changing the term "literature" to "fiction". Falseness is not a distinctive feature of literature.

It is assumed that this impediment applies not only to significant assertions about Mr. Mince and *Brodnigang* (the land of the giants in *Gulliver's Travels* Jonathan Swift) citing Ohmann, but also for sentences like: "it is a globally recognized truth, that a single man possessor of a great fortune, look for a wife" at the beginning of *Pride and Prejudice* from Austin (1895)*;* and "ll happy families are similar but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way" at the beginning of Ana Karenina, from Tolstoy (1887). But here the question is whether assertive sentences in literature really make assertions, and this is closely linked to the question of the intention of the author of the work.

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For now it will suffice to say that the assertion in the literary work does occur in a definite way through a term that has been coined in this work as "the principle of expanded cooperation" where through the use of Paul's maximum conversational Grice in the literary discourse, it is possible to determine what the work communicates on an intentional level, it also facilitates to identify the literary figures that the author uses for this purpose.

3.4. The transmission of meaning of literary discourse

This may be one of the most delicate aspects to explain, the question of whether the discourse of the literary work carries a meaning or not, of how it is transmitted and how it is interpreted; To find a satisfactory answer to these unknowns, the author's intentions must be analyzed very well. It is in fact one of the central points of the *work Towards a speech act theory of literary discourse* of Pratt, since in the search for the answers to these unknowns, the author associated with the theory Grice with the intentions already mentioned, through what she calls the principle of cooperation; according to Pratt:

> It is possible to enter into a dialogue of literary-pragmatic analysis if Grice's principle of cooperation is applied in an extended way to literary work, this implies that Grice's maxims must also be understood at this level so that the dialogue is enriching (Pratt, 1977, p. 102).

The author can use certain elements through the principle of extended cooperation to convey an idea, can be repetitive with an idea in order to give emphasis, or try to be sarcastic or metaphorical to handle a double background in the work, these cases will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

3.5. The emotional force of speech

It is true that one of the most important features of the discourse in general is the ability that entails to flow the listener or reader through a series of emotions that the author wants to teach, in order to gain credibility with his audience. Under this premise a great variety of literary theories are maintained. The most familiar, associated with Sussane Langer (1954), Richard and the new critics; They say that the distinctive use of words in literature is emotional (Richard, 2004). The literary work awakens and commands the feelings of the reader, and differs in this from scientific work and discourse, which refer mostly to the beliefs of the reader.

This seems like a very comfortable position to arrive at a definition of literature, which is more associated with the use of language and that allows to find a connection with Austin's speech acts. However, as Ohmann said: "Every speech has an impact on the emotions of the reader or the listener and some non-literary speeches are probably heavier emotionally than any literary speech" (1971, p. 10). The definitions of literature that are completely hidden under this characteristic only attempt to indicate a trend, and since under this effect the reactions of the readers are very variable, a literary analysis under this premise will be more framed from the aesthetic experience than under the criteria of pragmatic analysis.

3.6. The structure of the work as a feature

One of the elements to which literary analyzes most resort is the structure of the work that is had. Generally, the discourse is structured (more or less) according to the grammar of the language in which it is written, very often literary discourse reveals structures that are not required by grammar and that make it more complex, such as Metric and rhyme case.

For this reason, the formalists insisted on defining literature as a deviation from the norm, or a transgression to the rules; and it is easy to arrive at this definition by stating that it is true that metrics and rhyme can be taken as a break from the standard communication form scheme. Or in Jakcobson's words: "The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the center of selection to the center of combination" (1960, p. 356); that is, that a linguistic unit in a literary work is prone to have important relationships of similarity and contrast with other units in the discourse, rather than being related to them only through syntax.

Most formal studies of literature and academic definitions are covered, here, following the study of formalism, feeding on the orderly quality of the text. But these proposals tend to see the literary work as if it were a mathematical formula. Ohmann says that it is the same as the attempts by to define art in relation to the totality and symmetry of the work. Ohmann is also clear in criticizing a definition of literary work covered by the criteria of Jakobson (1960).

> But despite the importance that literature gives to repetition, variation, and patterns of all kinds; these facts do not delimit the kind of speeches we want to call dado <literature> since there are many matches, unnoticed and intentional in every speech. It would be a desperate measure to accept a definition of literature that says <speech with more than twenty pairs per one hundred words> and accept any consequences that this brings. We should not then be able to isolate a natural class from the domination of <literary works> (Ohmann, 1971, p. 12).

Ohmann's statement is correct in both directions, on the one hand, defining literature by virtue of the relation of his words seems a desperate and somewhat absurd measure; and on the other hand it seems to let the main meaning of literature, which is to tell a story and convey a message, be lost.

All aspects of the discourse mentioned in this chapter could well conform a definition of literature, and serve well as an evaluative criterion, if a work fails to connect with the audience then it will be severely penalized in this joint definition. However, there is an important generalization that is lost, because it is not enough to define when a literary work is a literary work, without relying on vague intuitions.

There is, then, a last resort that serves a definition of literature and that in turn allows an analysis of its use, and is precisely a definition supported by the theory of speech acts, from this perspective, the work gains a new face, the literary work seen with the eyes of the pragmatist. A literary work is a set of speech acts, which are related through the process of mimesis, but a special mimesis.

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By saying that a literary work does not contain declarations, commands, promises and the like, I am not saying that the conditions for declaring, ordering and promising are irrelevant to sentences in literature, but that they are relevant in a special sense: by leaving mimesis Take your place. So, Jane Austin does not make the statement "[...] it is a worldwide recognized truth that a single man [...]" and we are not going to take this part of the novel as an unhappy one, in Austin's terms, that is, as a misfortune by virtue of the falsity of the quasi statement. Making the statement is an imaginary ilocutive act. But to make this part of mimesis, the reader must consider whether the statement is true or false. Its falsehood is linked to the fact that the imaginary narrator of the story is being ironic, and that the reader must know it to build a speech act in question and all subsequent ones. "In sum, a literary work calls all the competitions of the reader as the decipher of acts of speech, but the one who is directly speaking-is (Ohmann, 1971, p. 13).

If Ohmann is right, then through this special mimesis the reader also gains a new value, and Jane Austin's example is very clear, the beginning of *Pride and Prejudice* is an act of speaking that the reader will identify throughout the novel as a sarcasm (sarcasm is explored more in the following title), and it is precisely a nod to what the rest of the plot will tell the reader regarding this statement, the fact of that the speech act occurs within a literary work does not preclude its analysis, only that a series of different factors that go hand in hand to the mimesis mentioned by Ohmann must be taken into account. This is not only a conclusion of its own, but is supported in another instance by Pratt:

> If the division between both languages (literary and natural) were true, then they could work separately, something that of course is impossible, given that Without the natural, literary language would not be sustained. In the same way that we use literary forms in everyday life (1980, p. 85).

3.7. The literary speech act

As has been stated, there is a close relationship between natural language and literary language, not only because one depends on the other, as Pratt put it in previous quotes, but because both can be analyzed under the same magnifying glass of linguistic pragmatics. Now, each sentence is designed to serve a specific function that is critical for communication, any speaker exposes the influence of his message to his listeners, and should make them recognize this. Otherwise, the fundamental function of language is not fulfilled, the communication is incomplete. Any literary discourse is a series of speech acts, and can be analyzed accordingly. This point is most obvious in the plays, which consist of alternating speech acts depending on the function that the character wants to achieve with each sentence.

In *Towards a speech act theory of literary discourse,* Pratt also refers to this in what it calls *the act of literary speech*, a kind of speech act that uses literary forms and figures to achieve a specific task. The thinker points out:

> This also happens in literature, where the communicative purpose of the work is encrypted behind a curtain of figures and narrative styles that press Grice's conversational maxims to persuade the reader, the author can sometimes in-

tentionally repeat or omit information for the purpose of that the reader may question the repetition or lack thereof (1977, p. 90).

And that is where the reader's ability to interpret these speech acts enters the scene.

This also applies to the prose of fiction, where dialogues are shared, let's take an example of Fitzgerald's work *The Great Gatsby,* acclaimed for its dialogues. The scene that was chosen is marked by the extreme alternation of speech acts intentionally forced by the author, that is, it takes the scene to a critical point through very strong declarative speech acts. It is the climax of the novel, the fight between Gatsby and Tom Buchanan in the hotel. In fact, the basic speech act is a request for Daisy and the fact that she must be persuaded by Gatsby and Buchanan to put herself on someone's side, even if there is a definite atmosphere of tension in the air. Tom provocatively highlights "What kind of hole are you trying to provoke in my house anyway?" And gives rise to the beginning of an unhappy and even inevitable conversation. Now comes Gatsby's first assault: "Your wife doesn't love you, she has never loved you, she loves me" (p. 187). Gatsby also orders Daisy to "Just tell her the truth" and force her Say you have never loved Tom. "She hesitated, because there was never, despite everything, thought to do something about it. But he had done it now, and it had been too late" (p. 187). Yes, it was done precisely through these speech acts.

While the situation becomes more tense, Gatsby and Buchanan go through many performative acts, exhortation, explanation, assertion, threats, orders, abdications, accusations, while continuing to perform ilocutive acts and without them allowing the atmosphere of tension to diminish. In the end, everything is "done". The scene is so rich in ilocutive acts that it establishes a wide range of emotions and human actions.

Often, in ironic situations, one finds what is called "ironic behavior" and "unintentional or unconscious irony"; the first is the irony of someone who is on purpose, the second is that of an unconscious victim. The ironic behavior of the author who remains invisible behind his work. You cannot choose a better example for this kind of ironic than Mark Twain's brief account of ironic behavior. He innocently intended to reach a serene state of disappointment, as expressed in this passage from *Huck Finn*:

- We've been waiting for you for a couple of days, what delayed you? Any boat on the road?

- Yes ma'am, that didn't stop us much, but we had to fly it with a cylinder pump.

- For God's sake, any wounded?

 - No, we kill a black man.

- Well, what luck, because sometimes people get hurt (2011, p. 150).

As an expert in the field of irony, Mark Twain reveals his real meaning without showing the slightest clue that there is anything beyond the ostensive meaning. There must also be a victim of irony, who does not pretend to be innocent but blind; that is, he does not suspect that things can be different from how he thinks, naively, that they are. The more blind you are to the situation, the more innocent the irony is and the more constrictive. Mark Twain proves it in the following excerpt.

-Mom, why is there so much pain and suffering? What is all that for?

- It is for our good, my son, in his wisdom the Lord sends us these afflictions to discipline us and make us better, none comes by accident.

- Isn't it very weird? So he sent Billy Norris tuberculosis?

- Yes.

- For what?

- Well, to discipline and do better.

- But he died, mom, and that couldn't be better.

- Well, then I guess it was for some other reason. I think it was to discipline their parents.

- Well that was not fair mom, it was he who was punished ... did he also make the roof fall on the stranger who tried to save the invalid old woman from the fire? (2011, p. 15).

Irony is a good example if one speaks of literary analysis, but also in pragmatic analysis. The previous paragraph is full of ilocutive speech acts, it is evident when mentioning the will of God on death that the boy's mother does not know how to answer him, but continues to do so only so that his son continues to question God's goodness in that case , but it's not just that the child is questioned or not. Twain is showing something else about his society by recreating a simple everyday situation like a child's questions to his mother, he is showing the double standards of the people of his time, he portrays the importance of faith in life. village life, and shows little concern for the things that were in its time. These perspectives are only gained from the moment when more than readers, we become deciphers of speech acts.

4. Conclusions

From what is analyzed in this article, there are many valid conclusions regarding the position of working for a pragmaliterature (the study of pragmatics focused on literary work). Among them are:

- The great contribution made by Austin and Searle with the development of the theory of speech acts, which turns the study of linguistics on the use of language rather than in its structure, which positions the pragmatics at the level of semiotics and semantics within the division of what occupies the field of study of linguistics.

- The division of speech acts into a consecutive, ilocutive and perlocutive act, brings with it a fundamental factor in this field: intention. It will be the intention that plays a fundamental role in the development of the pragmaliterary approach, the author's intention is a complex set of speech acts within a literary work.

- The statements that Austin and Searle make regarding literature, their qualifications of "parasitic" and "discoloration" are the fuel of this article, since contradicting them implies showing how the theories that they and other theorists have developed in

the pragmatic field operate. The reasons that these authors present are understandable reasons from the point of view of the speech act as such; but it must be taken into account that a speech act does not necessarily occur face to face in real time, written communication can also be analyzed in the same way.

• The contributions of Paul Grice are of immense value for the field of pragmatics and literature, as they provide a classification grid for the communicative process in both fields with their conversational maxims and their implicatures. The principle of cooperation is also a vital tool for the development of pragmatics and the analysis of literary work from this communicative approach.

• A literary work is a compendium of speech acts that act in a special mimetic way, that is, speech acts that not only develop the dialogue and plot of the work, but challenge the reader so that he can understand the message of the work by interpreting these acts. Likewise, the author has the freedom to hide his position behind the dialogues, which leads to the following inference.

• The author of the work can make use of the principle of *extended cooperation*, an extension of the Grice cooperation principle, but in literature, which allows the author to make use of elements that normally evade in ordinary communication , to be understood more bluntly; that is, the author of the work can break conversational maxims and fall into implications on purpose, in order to give clarity in the message he wants to show the reader, he can also show his position in the face of a particular event when he forces the acts of He speaks to create situations that lead the reader to wonder about what he reads. From this position, the reader ceases to be a passive agent, which does not matter to the author, to become an active understanding of speech acts.

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